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Suicide among service members and veterans challenges the health of 
America’s all-volunteer force. While any loss 
of military personnel weakens the U.S. armed 
forces, the rapid upswing in suicides among 
service members and veterans during the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan threatens to inflict 
more lasting harm. If military service becomes 
associated with suicide, will it be possible 
to recruit bright and promising young men 
and women at current rates? Will parents and 
teachers encourage young people to join 
the military when veterans from their own 
communities have died from suicide? Can the 
all-volunteer force be viable if veterans come to 
be seen as broken individuals? And how might 
climbing rates of suicide affect how Americans 
view active-duty service members and veterans 
– and indeed, how service members and 
veterans see themselves?
This policy brief has four objectives. First, it examines 
the phenomenon of suicide within the U.S. military 
community, including both the frequency of suicide and 
the extent to which suicide is related to military service. 
It outlines steps taken by the Department of Defense 
(DOD), the armed services and the Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA) to reduce suicide in the armed 
forces and among veterans. It then identifies obstacles to 
reducing suicides further and makes recommendations 
to address each of those obstacles. 
What We Know About Military Suicide 
The nuMberS Are STArK 
From 2005 to 2010, service members took their own 
lives at a rate of approximately one every 36 hours.1 
While suicides in the Air Force, Navy and Coast Guard 
have been relatively stable and lower than those of 
the ground forces, U.S. Army suicides have climbed 
steadily since 2004. The Army reported a record-high 
number of suicides in July 2011 with the deaths of 
33 active and reserve component service members 
reported as suicides. Suicides in the Marine Corps 
increased steadily from 2006 to 2009, dipping slightly in 
2010. It is impossible, given the paucity of current data, 
to determine the suicide rate among veterans with any 
accuracy. However, the VA estimates that a veteran dies 
by suicide every 80 minutes.2 Moreover, although only 
1 percent of Americans have served during the current 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, former service members 
represent 20 percent of suicides in the United States.3 
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to prevent suicide. Traditionally, military service has 
had a protective quality: Military service members 
have been less likely to die by suicide than civilians. 
It appears now, however, that the nature of military 
service – especially during wartime – may weaken 
all three protective factors.10 The cohesion and 
camaraderie of a military unit can induce intense 
feelings of belonging for many service members. Time 
away from the unit, however, may result in a reduced 
or thwarted sense of belonging, as individuals no 
longer have the daily support of their units and feel 
separate and different from civilians. This is especially 
true for Guardsmen and Reservists.
The responsibility inherent in military service, 
the importance of tasks assigned to relatively 
junior personnel and the high level of interaction 
among unit members establish the importance 
and usefulness of each unit member, particularly 
in an operational environment. In contrast, the 
experience of living in a garrison environment 
(for active component personnel) or returning 
to a civilian job (for Guardsmen, Reservists and 
veterans) or, worse, unemployment, can introduce 
feelings of uselessness. Individual accounts of 
military suicide both in the media and in interviews 
with us echo this sentiment. Over and over, these 
accounts show that individuals withdrew, felt 
disconnected from their units and their families, 
and perceived themselves as a burden. 
The U.S. military cannot avoid the stark reality 
of suicide entirely. Service members and veterans 
reflect the broader American public, which not 
only suffers from suicide, but also stigmatizes 
mental health care. Further, some service 
members enter military service with mental 
health challenges and we should not conclude 
that serving in the military caused these suicides. 
For instance, 31 percent of Army suicides are 
associated with factors from the years prior to 
entering the Army.4 
AddreSSing The probleM of MiliTAry Suicide 
requireS underSTAnding Suicide iTSelf AS 
Well AS The relATionShip beTWeen Suicide 
And MiliTAry Service 
Although the number of military suicides has 
increased since the start of the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, the prevailing wisdom has been that suicides 
are not linked directly to deployment.5 However, 
recent analysis of Army data demonstrates that 
soldiers who deploy are more likely to die by suicide.6 
Data have long indicated definitive links between 
suicide and injuries suffered during deployment. 
Individuals with traumatic brain injury (TBI), for 
instance, are 1.5 times more likely than healthy 
individuals to die from suicide.7 Additional factors that 
heighten risk include chronic pain and post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms such as depression, 
anxiety, sleep deprivation, substance abuse and 
difficulties with anger management.8 These factors are 
also widely associated with deployment experience in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.
SoMe pSychiATric experTS Argue ThAT There 
iS An indirecT relATionShip beTWeen Suicide 
And MiliTAry Service during WArTiMe 
One school of thought, known as the interpersonal-
psychological theory of suicide, suggests that the 
following three “protective” factors preclude an 
individual from killing oneself: belongingness, 
usefulness and an aversion to pain or death.9 Any 
one of these protective factors normally is sufficient 
“commit Suicide”
The authors of this report refrain from using the 
phrase “commit suicide.” The word “commit” 
portrays suicide as a sin or a crime, as those acts are 
typically “committed.” This language contributes to a 
stigma that prevents individuals from getting help.
The BBC takes a similar stance. See www.bbc.co.uk/
editorialguidelines/page/guidelines-harm-suicide 
for more information.
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The third protective factor – an aversion to pain 
or death – is especially important in considering 
military suicide, because military service is one of 
the few experiences that can override this factor. 
Repeated exposure to military training as well as 
to violence, aggression and death dulls one’s fear of 
death and increases tolerance for pain.11 Thus, the 
very experience of being in the military erodes this 
protective factor, even for service members who have 
not deployed or experienced combat, in part because 
service members experience pain and discomfort 
from the beginning of their training.12 By removing 
some of the protective factors of suicide, therefore, 
military service, especially during wartime, may 
predispose an individual toward suicide.
efforts and obstacles
leAderS in The ArMed ServiceS And The vA 
deServe recogniTion for Their AcTionS To 
reduce The rATe of Suicide AMong Service 
MeMberS And veTerAnS, buT fAce perSiSTenT 
obSTAcleS 
Senior military leaders have exerted considerable 
effort in recent years to acknowledge and confront 
the challenge of suicide. The VA and each of the 
military services have emphasized the development 
of suicide prevention programs, education about 
the risk of suicide and the most effective ways to 
prevent it. The DOD suicide prevention programs, 
with slogans such as “Never Leave a Marine 
Behind” and “Never Let Your Buddy Fight Alone,” 
TAble 1: Suicide rATeS by Service (2001-2010)
Sources: All data represent active duty suicide rates. Army 2001-2002, Air Force 2001-2003 and Marine Corps 2001-2005 data are from Department of Defense Task Force 
on the Prevention of Suicide by Members of the Armed Forces, The Challenge and the Promise: Strengthening the Force, Preventing Suicide and Saving Lives (August 2010). 
Army 2003-2010 data are provided by the Army Health Promotion and Risk Reduction Task Force. Navy 2001-2010 data are from the Navy Personnel Command website, 
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/support/suicide_prevention/Pages/HistoricStats.aspx. Air Force 2004-2010 data are from “Air Force Long Term Active Duty 
Suicide Rates” (August 12, 2011), AFSPP Manager of the AFMSA/SG30Q. Marine data for 2006-2010 rates were obtained from a telephone conversation with a Marine 
Corps representative, September 7, 2011. 
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resonate with service members by being service-
specific and embedded in their service cultures. 
The services ensure that the necessary tools, such 
as hotlines, are readily available. The VA’s Veterans 
Crisis Line is especially important in this regard. In 
its first three years, the hotline received more than 
144,000 calls involving veterans and saved more 
than 7,000 actively suicidal veterans.13 Obstacles 
remain nonetheless.
MiliTAry perSonnel TrAnSferS coMplicATe 
efforTS To help individuAlS STruggling 
WiTh MenTAl heAlTh iSSueS
Permanent change of station (PCS) moves are 
a feature of military life. Yet, such moves make 
it difficult for unit leaders to recognize and 
understand the unique mental health issues of 
their people, and for service members and military 
family members to obtain consistent mental health 
care. When military personnel arrive at a new 
unit, unit leaders are often unaware of particular 
service members’ personal challenges. Further, 
because professional organizations license mental 
health care providers on a state-by-state basis, a 
geographical move across state lines can preclude 
continued care from the same provider. When a care 
provider and a service member (or a military family 
member) invest in developing a care relationship, 
and that relationship is severed by a move, patients 
are often reluctant to begin treatment anew. 
Recommendation: The services need to ensure that 
information about a service member’s mental health 
well-being is transferred when that individual 
moves. When a unit commander has significant 
concerns regarding a departing member, he or 
she should discuss these issues with the receiving 
commander. Congress should establish a federal 
pre-emption of state licensing such that mental 
health care can be provided across state lines for 
those instances in which military service members 
or family members have an established pre-existing 
care relationship.
ArMy perSonnel TrAnSferS occur Too Soon 
AfTer deployMenT 
Army units returning home from deployment 
experience tremendous turnover, as individuals 
leave the unit for their next assignments. Because 
rotations do not occur immediately prior to or 
during deployments, individuals typically transfer to 
their next assignments during the post-deployment 
time frame. This lack of unit stability following 
a deployment has unfortunate implications for 
individuals struggling with reintegration. Leaders most 
familiar with the troops and most likely to recognize 
atypical or risk-taking behavior are gone. New leaders 
are less likely to interpret misbehavior by otherwise 
good soldiers as a warning sign. Recognizing the 
importance of unit stability, the Marine Corps has 
directed that Marines must remain assigned to their 
deploying unit for 90 days following deployment.14
Recommendation: The Army should establish a 
unit cohesion period following deployment.
coMMAnderS Are noT AlWAyS AWAre When 
SubordinATeS Are The SubjecT  
of An inveSTigATion 
A significant number of suicide victims were 
coping with legal problems.15 Yet, even though the 
notification of a criminal investigation is sometimes 
a suicide trigger, criminal investigators do not 
usually contact commanders when they inform a 
service member that he or she is the subject of an 
investigation.16 The Air Force has recognized this 
phenomenon and now coordinates its investigators 
and commanders more effectively. Air Force guidance 
underscores that the investigating agency and unit 
leaders share responsibility for the safety and well-
being of individuals under investigation. Further, if 
individuals appear emotionally distraught or agitated, 
investigators will release them only to unit leaders. 
Army investigators began informing commanders of 
individual investigations in 2011, but this practice is 
not followed consistently. Other services’ investigators 
do not regularly involve commanders. 
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Recommendation: The Army, Navy, Marine 
Corps and Coast Guard should ensure that 
investigators inform unit commanders of ongoing 
investigations, and that investigators work with 
unit leaders to ensure the safety and well-being of 
members under investigation.
The MenTAl heAlTh Screening proceSS 
folloWing deployMenT iS flAWed 
As service members return home from deployment, 
they complete a post-deployment health assessment 
(PDHA). As part of this assessment, they are asked 
questions about their physical and mental health, 
such as, “Did you encounter dead bodies or see 
people killed or wounded during this deployment?” 
and “During this deployment, did you ever feel that 
you were in great danger of being killed?” There 
are also self-evaluative questions, such as, “Are you 
currently interested in receiving information or 
assistance for a stress, emotional or alcohol concern?” 
While we do not question the contents of the 
assessment, its administration has been problematic. 
A 2008 study found that when Army soldiers 
completed an anonymous survey, reported rates 
of depression, PTSD, suicidal thoughts and 
interest in receiving care were two to four times 
higher as compared to the PDHA.17 Likewise, our 
interviews with veterans uncovered numerous 
accounts of returning service members whose 
unit leaders advised them to fabricate answers. 
Individuals across all services have been told, “If 
you answer yes to any of those questions, you are 
not going home to your family tomorrow.” This 
may be factually correct, but it neglects to inform 
service members of the implications of answering 
untruthfully – namely, that they will have difficulty 
receiving treatment or compensation for mental 
health problems that appear after their service. 
As an improvement, the 2010 National Defense 
Authorization Act requires trained medical or 
behavioral health professionals to conduct the 
PDHA evaluations individually and face-to-face,18 
in the hope that service members will respond 
honestly to a trained health professional. 
Recommendation: Unit leaders should encourage 
members to complete the PDHA truthfully and 
should underscore that a truthful answer will allow 
them to link any future mental health problems 
requiring treatment to their military service. 
A culTurAl STigMA ATTAched To MenTAl 
heAlTh cAre perSiSTS in The ArMed ServiceS 
The health and survival of service members hinges 
on the removal of the stigma associated with mental 
health care. This stigma exists in both military and 
civilian culture. In the military, it prevents many 
service members from seeking help to address 
mental health care issues; 43 percent of soldiers, 
sailors, airmen and Marines who took their own lives 
in 2010 did not seek help from military treatment 
facilities in the month before their deaths.19 The 
percentage of service members seeking help has 
improved – from 40 percent in 2008 and 36 percent 
in 2009 to 57 percent in 2010 – but the stigmatization 
of mental health care remains an issue.20 Military 
leaders recognize the importance of removing this 
stigma. Indeed, recently retired Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen identified the 
stigma of PTSD as the greatest challenge confronting 
troops returning from war in Iraq and Afghanistan,21 
and other DOD leaders at the highest levels have 
urged service members to seek mental health care as 
needed. Nevertheless, the stigma persists. 
This culture is unlikely to change quickly. 
Leaders have not provided sufficient guidance 
about how to remove the stigma associated with 
depression and suicidal thoughts, and they have 
not consistently disciplined service members 
who belittle or ridicule members with mental 
health issues.22 Removing the stigma for PTSD, an 
invisible injury, will be especially difficult, given 
that some service members do not even consider 
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TBI, which is physically evident and recognizable, 
a “real injury.”23 Yet the stigma must be removed 
to address and treat PTSD and TBI, both of which 
are linked to suicide. Further, despite policies to 
provide military memorial or burial to members 
who die by suicide, some commanders decline 
to provide their families this benefit. Anecdotal 
accounts suggest that these commanders 
sometimes believe that military memorials or 
funerals may seem to endorse or glamorize 
suicide. Although isolated, such denials of military 
remembrance disproportionately reinforce the 
stigma of mental health problems, particularly 
when these instances receive media coverage.24 
Recommendation: Military leaders must eliminate 
the stigma associated with mental health care, hold 
unit leaders accountable for instances in which 
individuals are ridiculed for seeking treatment, 
and ensure that military funerals or memorials are 
provided to all otherwise eligible service members 
who die by suicide. 
MiliTAry hAzing perSiSTS 
One to two percent of military suicides, and four 
to five percent of military suicide attempts, involve 
hazing in the unit or military workplace.25 This is 
a small percentage, but unacceptable nonetheless. 
In congressional testimony, senior military officers 
recently underscored that service policies prohibit 
hazing behavior.26 The services have also court-
martialed individuals for hazing, but isolated 
instances persist.
Recommendation: Service leaders must ensure 
that not only their policies but also their cultures 
prohibit hazing and abuse, and that the armed 
services do not harbor abusive leaders.
The nuMber of cAre providerS iS inSufficienT 
There is a national shortage of mental health care 
and behavioral health care professionals, a factor 
linked to higher rates of suicide. According to 
the VA, suicide rates decreased by 3.6 deaths per 
100,000 in seven regions27 where staff numbers 
increased to levels recommended in the 2008 
Veterans Health Administration Handbook.28 Sixteen 
regions are still not manned to these levels, however. 
Additionally, the Army has only 80 percent of the 
psychiatrists and 88 percent of the social workers 
and behavioral health nurses. With respect to 
psychologists, 93 percent of positions are filled.29 
Military hospital commanders have temporary 
authority to hire psychologists and social workers 
and behavioral health nurses on an as-needed basis, 
but a shortage of care providers precludes them from 
easily filling that gap. This shortage is a national issue, 
which affects the availability of care providers for the 
DOD and the VA. It also affects veterans’ families, 
who seek treatment from the civilian health care 
system to cope with the strain of reintegration. 
Recommendation: Congress should permanently 
establish expedited or direct hire authority 
allowing military hospitals to hire behavioral 
health care providers. 
legAl reSTricTionS prevenT MiliTAry leAderS 
froM diScuSSing privATely oWned WeAponS 
Forty-eight percent of military suicides in 2010 
occurred with privately owned weapons.30 Multiple 
studies indicate that preventing easy access to 
lethal means, such as firearms, is an effective 
form of suicide prevention.31 However, the 2011 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 
prohibits anyone within the DOD from “collect[ing] 
or record[ing] any information relating to the 
otherwise lawful acquisition, possession, ownership, 
carrying, or other use of a privately owned firearm, 
privately owned ammunition, or another privately 
owned weapon by a member of the Armed 
Forces or civilian employee of the Department of 
Defense” unless that individual lives on a military 
installation.32 The current law does allow military 
leaders to discuss privately owned weapons with 
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service members who appear to be a threat to 
themselves or others, but commanders cannot ask 
a severely depressed individual about personally 
owned weapons if that individual denies that he or 
she is considering harming himself or herself. 
Recommendation: Congress should rescind the 
NDAA 2011 restriction on discussing personally 
owned weapons so that unit leaders can suggest to 
service members exhibiting high-risk behavior, acting 
erratically or struggling with depression that they use 
gunlocks or store their guns temporarily at the unit 
armory. Given this change in law, unit leaders should 
engage both at-risk service members and their family 
members, and encourage them to obtain gunlocks or 
to store privately owned weapons out of the household. 
There iS exceSS preScripTion MedicATion  
in The MiliTAry coMMuniTy 
Misuse of prescription medication is another obstacle 
to addressing the problem of military suicide. 
Approximately 14 percent of the Army population is 
currently prescribed an opiate.33 Forty-five percent of 
accidental or undetermined Army deaths from 2006 
to 2009 were caused by drug or alcohol toxicity,34 and 
29 percent of Army suicides between 2005 and 2010 
included drug or alcohol use.35 
Data collected from civilian populations indicate 
that adults aged 18-34 are the most likely to 
have attempted drug-related suicides,36 and that 
58.9 percent of drug-related suicide attempts 
resulting in visits to an emergency room involve 
psychotherapeutic drugs.37 Another 36 percent of 
emergency room visits for suicide attempts involve 
pain medications.38 If we anticipate similar rates 
among military service members, it is important 
to address the excess prescription medicine among 
military service members. Yet, there is no opportunity 
to do so. When military doctors prescribe an 
alternative medication or dosage from what a service 
member was previously prescribed, there is no 
request made for the service member to return the 
remainder of his or her prior medication. Instead, 
military doctors dispense additional medications, 
because only law enforcement personnel can conduct 
“take-back” programs for medications. On January 26, 
2011, the Army Vice Chief of Staff requested that the 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) permit the 
Army’s military treatment facilities and pharmacies to 
accept excess prescription medicine for disposal.39 The 
request was denied.
Recommendation: The DEA should grant the DOD 
authority to accept and destroy excess prescription 
medication from military service members. Given 
this authority, the Office of the Army Surgeon General 
should initiate an effort with the Navy, Air Force and 
Coast Guard surgeon generals to develop policies and 
practices regarding how best to account for, and regain 
possession of, excess prescription medications.
uniT coMMAnderS hAve liMiTed viSibiliTy 
inTo Service MeMberS’ MedicAl probleMS 
Leaders are best able to help their troops when they 
know if individuals are struggling. Yet protected 
health information laws have precluded medical 
professionals from sharing information with 
the chain of command.40 Unit leaders can better 
help soldiers when the commanders are aware of 
significant problems. Proponents of behavioral 
health privacy laws, however, voice concern that 
military personnel will not seek help if they know 
that commanders will be informed.41 Consistent 
with this concern, health care providers should 
keep most medical information private. However, 
when behavioral health professionals believe that an 
individual is at high risk for killing one’s self, they 
should inform the relevant commander. The Army 
Leaders are best able to help their troops 
when they know if individuals are 
struggling. 
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has recently encouraged doctors to share information 
with commanders when doctors observe a soldier 
“at potential risk to themselves.”42 Nonetheless, it 
is unclear whether military behavioral health care 
providers are consistently following this suggestion. 
Recommendation: Behavioral health care providers 
should inform the unit commander when a service 
member is at high risk for suicide. The armed 
services should develop specific guidance for unit 
commanders on how to interact with individuals 
after receiving this information.
infrequenT inTerAcTion AMong drilling 
guArdSMen And reServiSTS liMiTS uniT 
leAderS’ AbiliTy To recognize And help 
SubordinATeS STruggling WiTh MenTAl 
heAlTh iSSueS 
The DOD approach to suicide prevention depends 
heavily on what experts refer to as “gatekeeper 
strategies.” The Army, for example, asserts that  
“[t]here is no other aspect of [its suicide prevention] 
that is more important for preventing negative 
outcomes than the vigilance of the individual 
commander, supervisor, Soldier, law enforcement 
agent or program/service provider. Leaders, 
supervisors, and ‘Buddies’ represent the first level 
for surveillance of high risk behavior.”43 
Although medical and academic experts identify 
gatekeeper approaches as one of the most promising 
strategies,44 the limitations of this approach are 
notable for the Guard and Reserve, where there 
are long monthly gaps between drill periods when 
leaders and peers do not have the opportunity to 
watch for warning signs. Yet studies indicate that 
even the smallest amount of contact can reduce 
the risk of suicide.45 These findings suggest that 
even postcards or text messages from unit leaders 
between drill weekends can help prevent suicides. 
Recommendation: The DOD should address 
weaknesses in gatekeeper-based programs for 
drilling Guard and Reserve units. Specifically, Guard 
and Reserve units should develop a leadership 
communication plan that addresses the stresses 
on units and details the frequency and method 
(written, electronic or telephone) by which small 
unit leaders should remain in contact with their 
subordinates. Leaders should pay closer attention to 
this communication following a deployment. 
The nATionAl guArd hAS Too MAny Suicide 
prevenTion progrAMS 
Assessing which suicide prevention strategies are 
effective requires systematic efforts to understand 
military suicide. Yet these efforts are thwarted 
by the existence of too many programs. Suicide 
prevention programs in the National Guard are a 
decentralized multitude that the Adjutant General 
(TAG) of each state and U.S. territory initiates and 
manages. This grassroots solution is inefficient 
given that, while some states had more suicides 
than others, overall the Army National Guard 
averages slightly more than one suicide per state 
annually. Although the individual programs may 
use evidence-based approaches, it will be difficult to 
demonstrate which suicide prevention programs are 
effective with the military community or efficacious 
in reducing suicide, because the small numbers do 
not support rigorous analysis. Even more important, 
these programs risk reduction or elimination due to 
dwindling state resources.46
Recommendation: The National Guard should 
reduce the number of unique suicide prevention 
programs, and consider adoption of a systemwide, 
centrally funded, prevention approach.
The True nuMber of veTerAnS Who die  
by Suicide iS unKnoWn 
Americans must have a more complete 
accounting of veteran suicide. The VA estimates 
The true number of veterans who die  
by suicide is unknown.
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that 18 veterans kill themselves every day,47 but 
this number is extrapolated from extremely 
limited data. Specifically, states provide death 
data to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) 
for inclusion in the National Death Index, but 
only 16 of U.S. states indicate veteran status in 
their data.48 The number of veteran suicides from 
the remaining 34 states is extrapolated to estimate 
the overall number of veteran suicides.49 Further, 
the current numbers are extrapolated from three-
year-old data. 
An effort is underway to match the Social 
Security numbers in the national death data 
with DOD files to identify veterans included in 
the data. This effort provides the capability to 
analyze the data and characterize the veteran 
victims of suicide. It will thus be possible to 
quantify veteran suicide and contribute an 
understanding of the number of suicides among 
post-9/11 veterans, as compared with veterans 
of earlier generations. This analysis could also 
permit an understanding of whether veterans kill 
themselves soon after leaving the military. 
The DOD does not currently take sufficient 
responsibility for veteran suicide. Given the 
potential implications of veteran suicide for the all-
volunteer force, the DOD should seek to understand 
which veterans, and how many veterans, are dying 
by suicide. In particular, the DOD, as well as the 
VA and the country at-large, should recognize that 
many veterans who left the service only shortly 
before they killed themselves may have suffered 
from unaddressed mental health wounds incurred 
while in service to their nation. 
Recommendation: Congress should establish 
reasonable time requirements for states to provide 
death data to the CDC, and the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) should ensure 
that the CDC is resourced sufficiently to expedite 
compilation of national death data. The DOD, the 
VA and HHS should coordinate efforts to analyze 
veteran suicide data and should conduct these 
analyses annually. 
underSTAnding And AddreSSing The 
chAllenge of Suicide requireS cooperATion 
beyond The TrAdiTionAl juriSdicTionAl 
boundArieS for MAny orgAnizATionS, 
including The dod, The vA, hhS And congreSS 
The programs and services designed to understand 
and reduce service member and veteran suicide 
should complement one another and gain both 
efficiency and effectiveness from interacting 
synergistically. Obtaining veteran suicide data and 
understanding the circumstances surrounding 
individuals who die by suicide depends on the 
states and the HHS, as well as on the participation 
of the VA and the DOD.50 Within DOD, the 
military services and components do not regularly 
and consistently share information. Further, the 
congressional committees that hold the DOD 
and the VA accountable are stove-piped. The 
House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and 
the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) 
interact only with DOD and generally do not 
address veteran suicide issues. Likewise the Senate 
Committee on Veteran Affairs and the House 
Veterans Affairs Committee, which represent 
veterans’ interests, interact with the VA, not with 
the DOD. 
Recommendation: The DOD, the VA and HHS 
should share data and information pertaining 
to suicide. The military services’ leaders 
should meet regularly to discuss issues and 
approaches pertaining to suicide, and to share 
lessons learned. The Senate Committee on 
Veterans Affairs and the House Veterans Affairs 
Committee should initiate discussions with 
SASC and HASC, with the intent of developing 
provisions for the NDAA to address the problem 
of veteran suicide. 
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conclusion
George Washington asserted, “The willingness 
with which our young people are likely to serve in 
any war, no matter how justified, shall be directly 
proportional to how they perceive the Veterans of 
earlier wars were treated and appreciated by  
their nation.” 
If Washington was correct, suicide among service 
members and veterans threatens the health of 
the all-volunteer force. Mentors and role models, 
including parents, teachers and, importantly, 
veterans, play a critical role in the enlistment 
decisions of young men and women. We should 
realize that these mentors and role models will not 
steer youth toward the military if they perceive 
damage to service members or a failure to address 
the mental health care needs of those who have 
served their country. 
The military must take care of its own. 
Although a goal of no suicides may be 
unachievable, the increasing number of suicides 
is unacceptable. Additionally, although benefits 
and services available from the Veterans Health 
Administration will likely remain the best 
system of care for veterans, the DOD has moral 
responsibility to acknowledge and understand 
former service members. 
America is losing its battle against suicide by 
veterans and service members. And, as more troops 
return from deployment, the risk will only grow. 
To honor those who have served and to protect the 
future health of the all-volunteer force, America 
must renew its commitment to its service members 
and veterans. The time has come to fight this threat 
more effectively and with greater urgency. 
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